Introduction
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (hereinafter: the Treaty) was signed by the representatives of the six States 1 in Rome on 25 March 1957. 2 Pursuant to its Article 224, the Treaty entered into force on the fi rst day of the month following the deposit of the instrument of ratifi cation by the last signatory State to take this step, ie on 1 January 1958. The intentions of the six States were laid down in the Preamble to the Treaty: the Euratom Community was established as a refl ection of the belief that 'nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the development and invigoration of industry and will permit the advancement of the cause of peace'. Consequently, the six States intended on one hand to 'create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the modernisation of technical processes and contribute, through its many other applications, to the prosperity of their peoples', and on the other hand to 'create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public'. Facing contemporary developments, 3 the Preamble of the Treaty highlighted that the joint effort of the six States must be 'undertaken without delay'.
Taking the intentions of the six governments into regard, one can easily understand that the provisions of the Treaty directly aim at supporting the development of the nuclear industry through the newly established Community. The Contracting Parties established the competences of the Community in ten areas, 4 seven of which explicitly address the further development of the nuclear industry. The three remaining areas cover issues of the protection of health against the dangers arising from ionising radiation, safeguards, and international relations. All these areas are the subject of regulation by Title II of the Euratom Treaty.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the establishment of Euratom triggered relatively wide interest from legal academia. 5 Euratom became the subject of several dissertations 6 and the Brussels-based 'Librairie encyclopédique' published the fi rst commentary on the provisions of the Treaty. 7 However, further developments caused a waning of academic interest in the Euratom Community. During the 1970s, it became clear that Euratom's competences would not be executed in the way the Treaty had foreseen, a fact described by some authors as the 'fi nal crisis of Euratom'. 8 In the following decades, Euratom triggered academic attention only occasionally, in particular with regard to its immunity to any amendments or changes. 9 Subsequently, the Euratom Community was referred to as being 'like a Chinese girl-child, exposed after birth 5 See K Cohen, 'European Atomic Energy Community ' (1959) The Euratom Community was referred to as having already been forgotten a decade after its establishment by some authors.
14 Other authors have recently pointed out that the Euratom Community still represents a kind of terra incognita for scholars of EU law. 15 In this respect, this article aims to analyse the Euratom Community from three different points of view.
Firstly, the provisions providing for the further amendments, adjustments, and additional specifi cation of the scope of application of the Treaty will be analysed. Taking the early stage of the nuclear industry into regard, these provisions were designed to refl ect the further developments of this new industrial branch and allow for necessary changes in the Treaty. Having said this, the concept of the Euratom Community can be described a 'provisional' one.
Secondly, the article will point out the existence of several provisions which were originally drafted to give the Euratom Community certain competences, but which have never actually been used by the Community. Consequently, from this point of view, the Community can be regarded as a 'static' one.
Thirdly, the Euratom Community will be analysed from the point of view of its recent norm-making activity. While originally intended mainly for the purposes of the further development of the nuclear industry, the Euratom Community has been gradually transformed into a Community establishing binding standards of nuclear safety in order to protect citizens and the environment. Consequently, from this point of view, it can be regarded as a 'fl exible' Community.
The current 60 th anniversary of the Treaty represents a good opportunity to deal in detail with the Euratom Community from these three different perspectives and, consequently, to revisit the characteristic features of this Community.
A 'provisional' community
When signing the text of the Treaty, the governments of the six States were aware that the newly born nuclear industry was in the stage of infancy and its future developments were to a certain extent unpredictable. At the same time, in strict contrast to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, 16 the Treaty was signed for an unlimited period of time (Article 208). Consequently, the signatories of the Treaty faced two contradictory interests: on the one hand, there was interest to support the speedy development of the nuclear industry, and on the other hand the signatories also aimed at the possibility of future adjustments and amendments of the applicable provisions if the circumstances so required. 17 Consequently, while the building of the nuclear industry was given priority by the executives of the six States, there was also awareness of the potential danger arising from the further development of this new technology. 18 These two contradictory interests were refl ected in several provisions of the Treaty, as outlined below.
Several articles provided for the future amendment of the scope of the application of the Treaty. Here, the provisions facilitating the promotion of nuclear research (Chapter 1) should be mentioned. In this area, the Treaty entrusted the Commission with the responsibility for promoting and facilitating nuclear research in the Member States and for complementing it by carrying out a Community research and training programme. The activity of the Commission in this respect should be carried out within the fi elds listed in Annex I to the Treaty. 19 Community research was to be carried out by a Joint Nuclear Research Centre, 16 Article 97 provided that this Treaty was concluded for a period of fi fty years from its entry into force. 17 The feeling of uncertainty concerning future developments of the nuclear industry was also refl ected in other international conventions adopted in this period. For example, the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 defi ned 'nuclear installations', to which a special regime of liability and compensation is to be applied as 'reactors other than those comprised in any means of transport; factories for the manufacture or processing of nuclear substances; factories for the separation of isotopes of nuclear fuel; factories for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; facilities for the storage of nuclear substances other than storage incidental to the carriage of such substances; and such other installations in which there are nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste as the Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy of the Organisation shall from time to time determine'. which was also commissioned by the Treaty to establish uniform nuclear terminology, a standard system of measurements and a central bureau for nuclear measurements. However, the scope of Community research was not considered to have been fi nally decided, 20 as Article 4 provided for the possibility to amend the scope of Annex I in the future. 21 Chapter 4, establishing a framework for facilitating investments in the nuclear industry, provides another example. Here, the Treaty provides that persons and undertakings engaged in the industrial activities listed in Annex II 22 should communicate to the Commission investment projects relating to new installations and also prospective replacements or conversions. The list of these industrial activities was also not considered to have been fi nally decided, as Article 44 also provided for the possibility to amend the scope of Annex II in the future. 23 Finally, a similar possibility was provided by Article 92 concerning the list of goods and products to be covered by the legal regime of the nuclear common market (Chapter 9). 24 Further, several articles provided for the possibility of future adjustments of all the chapters of the Treaty. Such a possibility concerned Chapter 6, establishing a framework for supplies of ores, source materials and special fi ssile materials in the Community. This framework was intended to be executed by the Euratom Supply Agency, which was commissioned by exclusive right concerning any deliveries from outside the Community. 25 However, Article 76 explicitly opened the possibility for the future adjustment of the whole chapter, underling its 'provisional' char-acter by setting an exact time limit for such adjustment. 26 A very similar possibility for future adjustment was provided regarding the framework of safeguards, as established in Chapter 7. Here, Article 85 did not contain any explicit time limit for such adjustment, but merely referred to prospective 'new circumstances'. 27 And fi nally, 'new circumstances' were identifi ed as the reason for future adjustment concerning Chapter 9, which provides for a framework of the Community's exclusive ownership of special fi ssile materials. 28 In this regard, Article 90 provides legal ground for prospective adjustment. 29 Lastly, Article 197 also authorised the Council to further specify to which materials certain chapters are applicable. 30 Such specifi cation must be done by the Council by a qualifi ed majority on a proposal from the Commission. as foreseen in the Treaty. 32 In this regard, the Court of Justice has had to deal with the question of whether these provisions remain valid or whether they have become obsolete in the meantime. In this regard, the Court argued, that:
Even an abstention by the Council from exercising the powers which it holds under the second paragraph of Article 76 with a view to adapting the provisions of Chapter 6 of the Treaty in the light of experience, cannot have the effect of causing these provisions to lapse, either immediately or at any subsequent date. Until the Council's decision, the provisions of Chapter 6 are only maintained on a temporary basis, so that at any moment there may be substituted for them a set of new provisions constituting a different supply system.
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While confi rming the temporary character of Chapter 6, the Court also argued that:
It cannot be presumed that provisions of the Treaty have lapsed. The Member States agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, having permanent institutions, invested with real powers, stemming from a limitation of authority or a transfer of powers from the States to that Community. Powers thus conferred cannot, therefore, be withdrawn from the Community and restored to the Member States except by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty. 34 Hence, while approving the validity of the provisions of Chapter 6, 35 the Court also reaffi rmed the future possibility to provide for further adjustments. 36 The provisions of the Treaty also today still provide for the possibility of further amendments, adjustments or specifi cation of the scope of application. This provides the possibility to change the scope of application of the Treaty without the need for further ratifi cation by the Member States. Such a specifi c regime concerns six out of ten chapters 32 of the Treaty, ie the framework for the promotion of research (Chapter 1), investments (Chapter 4), supplies (Chapter 6), safeguards (Chapter 7), property ownership (Chapter 8) and the common nuclear market (Chapter 9). Consequently, the existence of these provisions underlines the peculiar nature of the Euratom Community.
A static community
Originally, the Treaty provided for a number of provisions 37 aimed at reaching the goal to 'create the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry'. One can identify several of these provisions which have been used by the Euratom Community to address the speedy development of the nuclear industry: 37 This concerns provisions on the promotion of research (Chapter 1), dissemination of information (Chapter 2), investments (Chapter 4), joint undertakings (Chapter 5), supplies (Chapter 6), property ownership (Chapter 8) and the common nuclear market (Chapter 9). 38 'Community research and training programmes shall be determined by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, which shall consult the Scientifi c and Technical Committee. These programmes shall be drawn up for a period of not more than fi ve years. The funds required for carrying out these programmes shall be included each year in the research and investment budget of the Community. The Commission shall ensure that these programmes are carried out and shall submit an annual report thereon to the Council. The Commission shall keep the Economic and Social Committee informed of the broad outlines of Community research and training programmes. 2. Chapter 4 provides for the publishing of Nuclear Illustrative Programmes (PINC) in its Article 40. 41 The aim of these programmes is to facilitate coordinated development in investment efforts by undertakings in the nuclear industry. Altogether, six such illustrative programmes have been published. 42 The
45 Recently, the 'Fusion for Energy (F4E)', established to tackle the issue of nuclear fusion, represents the most salient example of such joint undertaking.
However, a number of the Treaty's provisions have remained unused due to the preference given to national instead of Community programmes (referred to as 'nuclear nationalism' by some authors 46 ) or due to the hostility of certain Member States towards the execution of some of Euratom's competences. 
The provisions of the Treaty offer numerous examples
48 of competences unused by the Euratom Community for one or both of the reasons mentioned above:
1. The establishing of an institution of university status, dealing with nuclear education, was foreseen in Article 9. However, due to the obvious preference given to national research programmes instead of common research undertakings, such an institution has never been established. 3. Finally, a directive 'to facilitate the conclusion of insurance contracts covering nuclear risks' (Article 98) has never been issued by the Council. 51 In this case, the reason for Euratom inactivity was the fact that a regional legal framework covering the fi eld of nuclear liability and compensation was established in the meantime by corresponding international conventions.
However, the Treaty has survived the last 60 years without any considerable amendments. Most of the changes in the text of the Treaty, 53 made over the last decades, were driven by the accession of new Member States and the subsequent need to refl ect these Member States in the institutional structure of the Community. 54 Consequently, at the beginning of the new millennium, the Treaty became subject to vigorous criticism. Hence, it was argued, that the Treaty was 'outdated, undemocratic, and biased towards the electronuclear industry'. 55 If the EEC was initially predominantly 'functional', the EU is now predominantly (or at least increasingly) 'humanist'. 56 The Euratom has not undergone the same evolution. In contrast to the EU, the Euratom's tasks (or objectives) have never been amended. They are the same as when the Treaty was adopted.
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Refl ecting this criticism, several proposals addressing the question of Euratom were prepared at the beginning of the new millennium. 57 Ibid. 58 The Penelope Proposal aimed to address the question of Euratom by abolishing the provisions of Chapter 6 (supplies), Chapter 8 (property ownership) and Chapter 9 (Common nuclear market) as these were considered obsolete. Further, the provisions of Chapter 3 (health and safety), Chapter 4 (investments), Chapter 5 (joint undertakings) and Chapter 7 (safeguards) were intended to be incorporated into the text of a new Regulation, dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Praesidium Proposal aimed at the further existence of the Treaty. However, Article 184, granting Euratom a legal personality, was intended to be cancelled. Finally, the Nagy Proposal aimed at the full abolishment of the Treaty and at the incorporation of the provisions on health and safety into the text of the Treaty establishing a However, none of these proposals were accepted and the further existence of the Treaty was subsequently confi rmed by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. 59 Thus, after six decades of Euratom's existence, 'the conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry' as provided for by the Treaty remain in their original version. The Euratom Community continues to exist as an independent legal personality, parallel to the European Union. The legal framework that has been established by the Euratom Community has the nature of leges speciales in relation to the legal framework established by the European Union. And consequently, the latter is to be applied subsidiarily in cases where explicit special regulation is missing. 
A fl exible community
In her paper on Euratom Community perspectives at the start of the new millennium, Christiane True gave several reasons for the static nature of the Treaty. 61 The unwillingness of the majority of the Member States to pursue any considerable amendment of the Treaty was explained by the delicate nature of the subject, by the existence of a number of contradictory interests, and also by the fact that the Treaty itself does not provide for any explicit obligation to use nuclear energy in the territory of the Member States. However, the Treaty has also proved to be quite fl exible, in particular in the protection of health and safety. This is due to the fact that while the competences conferred to Euratom originally included only the fi eld of radiological protection, they were later interpreted in a broader sense also to cover issues of nuclear safety. eral competence (Article 38), the European Commission should make recommendations to the Member States regarding the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil. 63 Further, the Commission possesses several special competences in this area. In the fi rst place, any Member State in whose territories particularly dangerous experiments are to take place must take additional health and safety measures, on which they must fi rst obtain the opinion of the Commission (Article 34). Additionally, the Commission has the right of access to facilities carrying out continuous monitoring of the level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil and it may verify their operation and effi ciency (Article 35). Finally, Article 37 authorises the Commission to issue opinions on the plans of the Member States for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form.
However, it was the norm-making competence of the Euratom Community in the area of health and safety which gradually became a tool to address a relative wide range of issues. Pursuant to Article 30, basic standards are to be laid down within the Community for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against dangers arising from ionising radiation. 64 These basic standards are to be worked out by the Commission after it has obtained the opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientifi c and Technical Committee from among scientifi c experts, and in particular public health experts, in the Member States. The Commission must obtain the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on these basic standards (Article 31). In this respect, each Member State is obliged to lay down the appropriate provisions, whether by legislation, regulation or administrative action, to ensure compliance with the basic standards which have been established.
The question of the applicability of the rules laid down in Chapter 3 has become the subject of several decisions rendered by the Court of Justice.
1. On one hand, the Court had to deal with the question of whether the provisions of Chapter 3 are also applicable to military installations. 65 Concerning the application of Article 37 (plans for the disposal of radioactive waste) to a military installation, 66 the Court argued that:
The evidence on interpretation to be taken into consideration cannot be limited to the historical background to the drawing up of the Treaty, or to the contents of the unilateral declarations made by the representatives of certain States who took part in the negotiations which led to the signature of that Treaty. As the Advocate General rightly pointed out in points 80 and 81 of his Opinion, it is clear from that background and certain declarations mentioned in the travaux préparatoires of the Treaty that its possible application to the military uses of nuclear energy was envisaged and discussed by the representatives of the States who took part in those negotiations. However, it is also apparent that they held differing opinions on that issue and that they decided to leave it unresolved. Consequently, the guidance provided by that evidence is not suffi cient for it to be asserted that the framers of the Treaty intended to make its provisions applicable to military installations and military applications of nuclear energy. 67 However, the Court also stated, that:
An interpretation of Article 37 to the effect that the Member State concerned might decide both the time from which a military source of radioactive waste must be regarded as civil waste and the actual content of the data which must be communicated to the Commission would be in contradiction with the purpose of that provision. (…) Furthermore, an interpretation of Article 37 which allowed Member States such discretion as to the time for communicating data and its content would be a or which, after being so processed, are, in accordance with an operational plan, placed or stored in a military establishment'. Further, Article 86 stipulates, that 'the Community's right of ownership shall extend to all special fi ssile materials which are produced or imported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking and are subject to the safeguards provided for in Chapter 7'. Consequently, it used to be argued that Chapter 7 (safeguards) and Chapter 8 (property ownership) are not applicable to any military installations. On the contrary, according to some interpretations, the provisions of other chapters were to be applied also to military facilities. Such an interpretation was underlined by the fact that France proceeded according to Article 34 when experimenting with nuclear explosions in the Sahara at the beginning of the 1960s. Besides, Article 52, which provides that the Euratom Supply Agency 'may not discriminate in any way between users on grounds of the use which they intend to make of the supplies requested unless such use is unlawful', was interpreted in favour of the applicability of Chapter 6 (supplies) on military installations. In detail, see A Breda, 'Alla ricerca del delicato equilibrio tra protezione della salute e difesa della sicurezza nazionale nell' ambito del Trattato Euratom' (2005) 2(4) DPCE 1126.
source of dispute and would undermine the effective application of that provision. 68 In another case, the Court had to deal with the issue of the applicability of the basic standards to the operation of a nuclear-powered vessel. 69 In this respect, the Court argued that:
To accept that in such a situation the obligation laid down in (…) the directive is incumbent none the less on Member States would amount to recognising that the provisions of the Treaty concerning health and safety, in particular Article 31, which provides the basis for that directive, are different in scope from the other provisions of that Treaty.
Whether the provisions of that Treaty applied to activities within the military sphere would thus depend on the nature and scope of the obligations which those provisions impose on Member States. It would therefore be necessary to assess in each case the damage which performance of those obligations may cause to the essential national defence interests of those States.
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Consequently, the Court argued, that 'as the scope of provisions of secondary legislation cannot validly exceed that of their legal basis, the inapplicability of Article 31 to military activities necessarily means that the directive does not apply to such activities'. 71 Consequently, the provisions of the Treaty proved to be fl exible enough to respect certain vital interests of its Member States in the area of defence policy by enabling a rather restrictive interpretation of its scope. 71 Ibid, para 27. 72 However, in Case C-65/04, the Court also stated, that 'it is important to note, however, that that fi nding does not by any means reduce the vital importance of the objective of protecting the health of the public and the environment against the dangers related to the use of nuclear energy, including for military purposes. In so far as the EAEC Treaty does not provide the Community with a specifi c instrument in order to pursue that objective, it is possible that appropriate measures might be adopted on the basis of the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty' (para 28).
were originally not willing to commission Euratom with any competences in this sensitive fi eld. Therefore, Euratom restricted its activities here to two unbinding recommendations. 73 This kind of response to the issues of nuclear safety, arising in the post-Chernobyl period, was not considered appropriate by many stakeholders. Thus, it was felt that 'the fact that the Member States retain exclusive competence over the technological aspects of nuclear safety does not prevent the Community from adopting legislation which establishes certain safety requirements, authorisation requirements, inspection and assessment requirements or enforcement mechanisms'. 74 Consequently, dealing with the issue of the Community's accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety of 1994, the Court argued, that:
Even though the Euratom Treaty does not grant the Community competence to authorise the construction or operation of nuclear installations, under Articles 30 to 32 of the Euratom Treaty the Community possesses legislative competence to establish, for the purpose of health protection, an authorisation system which must be applied by the Member States. Such a legislative act constitutes a measure supplementing the basic standards referred to in that article. (…) Under Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty, the Community possesses competence as regards 'any plan for the disposal of radioactive waste in whatever form' if the implementation of that plan is liable to result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State. That fact provides suffi cient grounds to conclude that the Community possesses competence in the fi eld covered by Article 17 of the Convention. The measures required by Articles 18 and 19 of the Convention concerning the design, construction and operation of nuclear installations can be the subject of the provisions which the Member States lay down to ensure, in accordance with the fi rst paragraph of Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty, compliance with the basic standards. However, the Commission has competence to make recommendations for harmonising those provisions, as is clear from the second paragraph of Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty, interpreted in the light of the considerations set out in paragraphs 75 to 83 of the present judgment. The Member States are required to assist in drawing up those recommendations through the communications referred to in the third paragraph of Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty.
While being originally intended mainly 76 for the purposes of the further development of the nuclear industry (in particular by promoting nuclear energy by common research activities, investment coordination and establishing joint undertakings), Euratom has been gradually transformed into a Community establishing binding standards of nuclear safety in order to protect citizens and the environment. 77 The extensive interpretation of the competences arising from the Treaty opened the doors for a new period of legislative activity. 78 In 2009, the issue of nuclear safety became the subject of legal regulation under the Euratom Community. 79 Subsequently, in 2011, a directive was issued to address the issue of safety regarding spent fuel and radioactive waste management. 80 In response to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, risk and safety assessments ('stress tests') were carried out on all nuclear power plants situated in the territory of the Euratom Community. Neighbouring countries were also associated with this, and Switzerland and Ukraine participated fully. Beyond this, the European Commission encouraged and cooperated with nuclear regulators around the world to perform similar exercises. The aim of the assessments was to check whether the safety standards used when specifi c power plants received their licences were suffi cient to cover unexpected extreme events. Specifi cally, the tests measured the ability of nuclear facilities to withstand damage from hazards such as earthquakes, fl ooding, terrorist attacks or aircraft collisions. Subsequently, the results of these 'stress tests' were refl ected in the amendment of the nuclear safety directive in 2014. Taking these very recent developments into consideration, it can be seen that this new role of Euratom is far from the role originally conferred to this Community by the signatories of the Treaty. However, this new role has naturally become the subject of criticism in the sense that it exceeds the limits established by the Member States in the text of the Treaty. 
Conclusions
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community has largely remained in its original version of 1957 until today. Given its age and its largely unamended state, the Treaty has often been called a 'fossil', particularly by those who wish to phase out nuclear technology for energy generation altogether. There are also some features that are open to more general criticisms: these include provisions which do not appear to meet today's requirements, the existence of provisions of a provisional nature, and of provisions which have never been applied as intended by the signatories of the Treaty. Very recently, Anna Södersten has argued that 'while the Euratom has some important functions, the EU could equally perform many of these functions' and that 'given the expansion of EU competencies, there is no longer a need for the Euratom Treaty as a separate body'. 85 However, the new millennium led to a considerable shift in Euratom's legislation: following the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning Euratom's accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (2001), directives regulating the area of nuclear safety and radioactive waste management have been enacted. Thus, although intended to be a 'provisional' Community, Euratom has been gradually transformed into an 'environmental Community' 86 establishing binding legal norms for the protection of citizens and the environment, in particular in the fi eld of nuclear safety. This new role of Euratom is quite far removed from the original purpose of the Community, which was in the beginning intended to support the growth of the nuclear industry rather than to impose safety restrictions on it. It is not a 'serpent' 87 that we see here. Neither is it a phoenix, 88 cyclically regenerating itself from its own ashes. Euratom is a true chameleon. 86 Schroeder (n 77). 87 Prieto Serrano (n 11) 14. 88 Barnes, 'The Resurrection of the Euratom Treaty' (n 9) 182.
